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THE KEYSTONE XL PIPELINE AND THE DORMANT COMMERCE 
CLAUSE: WOULD ACTION BY CONGRESS PRECLUDE ADEQUATE 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AT THE STATE LEVEL? 
 
S. Shane Stroud * 
 
The Commerce Clause significantly limits the ability of States and 
localities to regulate or otherwise burden the flow of interstate commerce, 
but it does not elevate free trade above all other values. As long as a State 
does not needlessly obstruct interstate trade or attempt to place itself in 
a position of economic isolation, it retains broad regulatory authority to 
protect the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural 
resources.1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In May 2012, Canadian energy company TransCanada Corporation filed the 
most recent of several applications with the United States Department of State (State 
Department) to construct a cross-border crude oil pipeline from western Canada to 
the oil refineries situated along the Gulf of Mexico.2 If approved, the Keystone XL 
pipeline would transport Canadian crude oil nearly seventeen hundred miles from 
facilities north of Hardisty, Alberta to refineries in Texas, passing through Montana, 
South Dakota, and Nebraska before joining an existing TransCanada pipeline just 
north of Kansas’s border with Nebraska.3 If completed, the Keystone XL pipeline 
would have the largest capacity of any cross-border pipeline between Canada and 
the United States.4 However, the State Department has yet to approve the permits 
necessary for TransCanada to begin construction of Keystone—a move some 
                                              
 * © 2015 S. Shane Stroud. J.D. 2014, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. 
Thanks to Professors Robin Craig, Michael Teter, and Robert Keiter for their excellent 
instruction on the subjects of constitutional and natural resources law. Thanks also to the 
editors and members of the Utah Law Review. Your astute observations and eyes for detail 
strengthened this Note immeasurably. Last but not least, thanks to my family, and in 
particular my partner Dean Mellott, without whose unwavering support this Note (and, 
indeed, my J.D.) would never have come to fruition. 
 1  Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935)). 
 2  PAUL W. PARFOMAK ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41668, KEYSTONE XL 
PIPELINE PROJECT: KEY ISSUES 2–3 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
R41668.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4B3Y-JWFY. 
 3 See id. at 2–4. 
 4 See JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42611, OIL SANDS AND 
THE KEYSTONE XL PIPELINE: BACKGROUND AND SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 22 tbl. 
3 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42611.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/3XP9-XKD4. 
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lawmakers perceive as an attempt by the Obama Administration to block the 
project’s construction.5 
 In response to this perceived inaction, the United States House of 
Representatives, led by House Republicans, voted to approve a bill that would 
authorize construction of the Keystone XL pipeline without State Department 
approval in May 2013.6 The genesis of the bill flowed primarily from congressional 
frustration over the perceived lack of action by the Obama Administration, which 
had failed to either approve or outright deny any of TransCanada’s many 
construction permit applications during the previous five years for a pipeline project 
many see as essential to America’s energy future.7 
 But because the House bill approving Keystone XL is unlikely to pass the 
Senate and has no chance of being signed into law by President Obama,8 it is likely 
dead on arrival and is best viewed as a message bill with the primary purpose of 
expressing the House’s discontent with the President’s handling of the Keystone XL 
pipeline.9 Nevertheless, the very fact the Bill was proposed and passed by the House 
raises unique questions specific to the cross-border pipeline permitting process. 
Specifically, because Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to permit 
the Keystone XL pipeline,10 bypassing any “obstruction” on the part of the Obama 
                                              
 5 See Andrew Restuccia, House Passes Bill Approving Keystone Pipeline, POLITICO 
(May 22, 2013, 8:15 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/05/house-passes-keystone-
pipeline-bill-91792.html, archived at http://perma.cc/UX3G-QEYQ. 
 6 Id. 
 7 See id. 
 8 See Stephen Dinan, Obama Administration Threatens Keystone Veto, WASH. TIMES 
INSIDE POL. BLOG (May 21, 2013, 2:37 PM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/inside 
-politics/2013/may/21/obama-administration-threatens-keystone-veto/, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/J3QS-JDDE. 
 9 See Restuccia, supra note 5. 
 10 This Note proceeds under the assumption that Congress retains authority under the 
Commerce Clause to regulate cross-border projects that would substantially affect foreign 
commerce, such as the Keystone XL pipeline project. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. v. United 
States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933) (noting that when Congress acts in matters of “international 
relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade[,] the people of the United States 
act through a single government with unified and adequate national power”). Whether the 
President’s authority to regulate foreign affairs conflicts with Congress’s authority to 
regulate foreign commerce under the Commerce Clause is beyond the scope of this Note. 
However, several justices have acknowledged Congress’s authority to act without limitation 
pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority should it choose to do so, effectively recognizing 
that Congress may remove the Executive’s ability to act unilaterally in approving cross-
border commerce projects like Keystone XL. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 609 
(1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing Congress’s authority to act pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause as “plenary”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President takes measures incompatible with 
the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely 
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over 
the matter.”). Accordingly, if Congress were to act to remove the State Department’s current 
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Administration, would the so-called dormant Commerce Clause preclude or 
substantially limit the ability of individual states to impose environmental 
regulations that would affect the Keystone XL pipeline project?  
 This Note explores this issue and concludes that state environmental regulation 
of the Keystone pipeline would likely pass judicial scrutiny so long as those 
regulations were passed pursuant to a legitimate state interest. Part I explores the 
history of the Keystone XL pipeline project and focuses on the current 
environmental analysis of the project. Part II discusses the dormant Commerce 
Clause’s background, how it has been applied in the context of state environmental 
regulations, and how its application might affect future environmental regulations. 
Finally, Part III looks at the proposed project through the lens of the dormant 
Commerce Clause. It concludes that states concerned about the Keystone XL 
pipeline’s ramifications can enact constitutional legislation to preserve their 
environments even if doing so would burden interstate commerce. 
 
I.  THE KEYSTONE XL PIPELINE PROJECT 
 
A.  History of the Project 
 
 The Keystone XL pipeline proposal is not so much an original project as it is a 
sizeable addition to an already extensive network of pipelines between 
TransCanada’s Alberta-based crude oil extraction facilities and a larger heavily used 
pipeline that runs through the heart of the American Midwest.11 Notably, a large 
portion of the network, of which Keystone XL would be part, already exists in the 
form of a pipeline that runs east from Alberta to Saskatchewan; then drops south 
across the international border; and finally runs through Montana, North and South 
Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, and Oklahoma.12 However, the proposed Keystone XL 
extensions would shortcut the current pipeline route and allow a more direct link 
between the crude resource in Canada and the refinery capabilities of the U.S. Gulf 
                                              
ability to approve cross-border pipelines like the Keystone XL project, it is likely the Court 
would find such an action to be a constitutional exercise of Congress’s authority under the 
Commerce Clause. See Sierra Club v. Clinton, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1163 (D. Minn. 2010) 
(acknowledging Presidential authority to issue cross-border pipeline permits as 
constitutional because “Congress has not attempted to exercise any exclusive authority over 
the permitting process”); Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate v. U.S. Dep't of State, 659 F. Supp. 2d 
1071, 1081 (D.S.D. 2009) (noting that the President retains power to issue permits for cross-
border pipeline projects because “Congress has failed to create a federal regulatory scheme 
for the construction of oil pipelines”); Ryan Harrigan, Transcanada's Keystone XL Pipeline: 
Politics, Environmental Harm, & Eminent Domain Abuse, 1 U. BALT. J. LAND & DEV. 207, 
218 (2012) (noting the proposed Keystone XL pipeline “falls directly within Congress’ 
delegated power”). 
 11 PARFOMAK ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 fig.2. For an excellent overview of the proposed 
project, see Kurt Gasser, Note, The TransCanada Keystone XL Pipeline: The Good, the Bad, 
and the Ugly Debate, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 489 (2012).  
 12 PARFOMAK ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 fig. 2. 
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Coast. 13  If approved, these new sections would result in construction of 
approximately fourteen hundred miles of new thirty-six-inch diameter pipe in the 
United States at a cost of nearly seven billion dollars.14  
 While TransCanada envisions the pipeline would initially carry approximately 
seven hundred thousand barrels of crude oil per day,15 the pipeline would be capable 
of transporting as much as eight hundred and thirty thousand barrels per day if 
changes in market conditions led to greater demand.16 Additionally, the Keystone 
XL pipeline route would be designed to carry approximately one hundred thousand 
barrels per day from oil resources located in Montana and North Dakota, as well as 
one hundred and fifty thousand barrels of oil per day from Oklahoma’s oil fields.17 
All told, the project would represent a major expansion of North America’s crude-
oil-transportation capabilities, keeping pace with the Gulf Coast region’s expanding 
refining capabilities at a time when international crude imports are falling.18  
 Proponents of the pipeline, such as Speaker of the House John Boehner, claim 
Keystone XL’s construction “will create tens of thousands of American jobs and 
pump nearly a million barrels of oil to U.S. refineries each day, helping to lower gas 
prices, boost economic growth, enhance our energy security, and revitalize 
manufacturing.” 19  Opponents argue the Keystone XL pipeline application was 
inadequately reviewed for detrimental environmental impacts.20 They argue that if 
approved the Keystone XL pipeline will greatly contribute to climate change21 and 
                                              
 13  BUREAU OF OCEANS & INT’L ENVTL. & SCI. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE PROPOSED 
KEYSTONE XL PROJECT ES-1 to ES-4 (2011), available at http://keystonepipeline-
xl.state.gov/documents/organization/182010.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/83L6-BTBT 
[hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT]. 
 14 Id. at ES-2. 
 15 Id. at ES-1. A barrel of crude oil is equivalent to 42 gallons. Frequently Asked 
Questions, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=24&t=10, 
archived at http://perma.cc/C44L-DT8W (last visited Aug. 27, 2014). 
 16 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 13, at ES-
2. 
 17 Id. at ES-3. 
 18 Id. at ES-5 to ES-6. The region’s refining capability is projected to expand by 
approximately 500,000 barrels per day over the next six years. Id. at ES-6. This is on par 
with Keystone’s existing contracts to carry 535,000 barrels per day of Canadian and U.S. 
crude oil should the project be completed. See id. at ES-5. 
 19 Press Release, Speaker Boehner’s Press Office, House Votes to Approve Keystone 
Pipeline, Create Tens of Thousands of Jobs & Increase Energy Security (May 22, 2013), 
available at http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/house-votes-approve-keystone-pipeline-
create-tens-thousands-jobs-increase-energy, archived at http://perma.cc/4FXL-TAQS. 
 20 See John H Cushman, Jr., EPA Deems U.S. State Department Keystone Review 
‘Insufficient,’ GUARDIAN ENV’T NETWORK (Apr. 23, 2013, 10:49 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/apr/23/epa-keystone-green-groups, archived 
at http://perma.cc/JEH2-HCHP. 
 21 Lucia Graves, State Department’s Keystone Analysis Ignores True Climate Impact: 
Report, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 16, 2013, 2:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013 
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increase the risk of oil spills in the United States and Canada.22 Both sides seem to 
agree, however, that the debates over the costs and benefits of the Keystone XL 
pipeline are not likely to end when the project is approved. And in particular, 
questions over the environmental impacts of the pipeline are likely to be at issue 
well into the foreseeable future. 
 
B.  Current Environmental Analysis of the Keystone XL Pipeline 
 
 If construction of Keystone XL goes forward, it will only be after the 
appropriate “hard look” the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires of 
all projects that involve action by a federal agency and that might “significantly 
affect[] the quality of the human environment.”23 Under NEPA, whenever a federal 
agency takes an action that might significantly affect the human environment, the 
federal agency must carefully consider the impact such actions will have on the 
environment and inform the public as to the results of those findings.24 
 Consideration of environmental impacts under NEPA takes place in two 
general phases: the preparation of a draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and 
preparation of a final EIS.25 First, when an agency completes a draft EIS, it must 
make the EIS available for public comment and input from any “[c]ooperating 
agency . . . which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any 
environmental impact” associated with the project.26 Then the “lead agency” in 
charge of preparing the draft EIS reviews and often responds to comments from the 
public and any cooperating agencies to aid in the completion of a final EIS.27 
 In the case of the Keystone project, the “lead agency” has thus far been the 
State Department, as permitting authority currently rests with the President. 28 
Accordingly, once the State Department assembled the draft EIS for the project, it 
released the draft to the public and submitted it to the Environmental Protection  
 
 
                                              
/04/16/state-department-keystone-report_n_3092865.html, archived at http://perma.cc/X4P 
D-48H7. 
 22 Keystone XL Pipeline, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, http://www.foe.org/projects/climate 
-and-energy/tar-sands/keystone-xl-pipeline, archived at http://perma.cc/C3FF-QZGT (last 
visited June 14, 2014). 
 23 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012). 
 24 PARFOMAK ET AL., supra note 2, at 7–8. In addition, NEPA requires the federal 
agency in charge of approving any project that might significantly affect the human 
environment to consult with additional agencies—like the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 
the U.S. National Park Service, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers—depending on the 
area that will be affected by the agency’s action and the jurisdictions of those agencies. Id. 
at 14–15. 
 25 Id. at 7. 
 26 40 C.F.R. § 1508.5 (2014). 
 27 See id.§ 1508.16.  
 28 PARFOMAK ET AL., supra note 2, at 7. 
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Agency (EPA), one of the cooperating agencies for the Keystone project as 
implicated by NEPA.29  
 After careful review of the State Department’s draft EIS, the EPA rated the 
draft EIS as “[i]nadequate,” noting “potentially significant impacts were not 
evaluated, that more information and analysis was needed, and [that] the draft EIS 
would need revision and again be made available for public review.”30 Thereafter, 
the State Department issued a supplemental draft opinion that addressed the 
concerns of the EPA, other federal agencies, and the public.31  
 However, the EPA was skeptical of the supplemental draft; it acknowledged 
that the State Department had “worked diligently” in addressing the shortcomings 
of the original draft EIS, but the EPA found the supplemental draft contained 
“[i]nsufficient [i]nformation.” 32  To address these shortcomings, the EPA 
recommended the State Department more fully address the following: 
 
potential oil spill risks, including additional analysis of other 
reasonable alternatives to the proposed pipeline route; provide 
additional analysis of potential oil spill impacts, health impacts, and 
environmental justice concerns to communities along the pipeline 
route and adjacent refineries; and improve its characterization of 
lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions associated with Canadian oil 
sands crude.33 
Whether the State Department carefully considered the EPA’s admonitions is 
unclear.34 
 However, regardless of whether the State Department fully considered the 
EPA’s suggestions, the State Department released a final EIS for the Keystone XL 
pipeline in August of 2011.35 Members of Congress immediately resisted the final 
EIS. 36  Specifically, fourteen members of Congress wrote letters to the State 
Department questioning its handling of the EIS preparations. 37  These 
representatives were prompted to question the State Department, at least in part, by 
new reports indicating the EIS had been prepared by an outside agency, which was 
at the time in contact with the pipeline’s developer, TransCanada.38 Likely as a result 
of these contentions, the Inspector General’s Office initiated a probe into whether 
the State Department had violated its duty as an unbiased decision maker when 
                                              
 29 Id. at 8–9.  
 30 Id. at 10 tbl.1.  
 31 Id. at 35–36. 
 32 Id. at 35. 
 33 Id. at 36. 
 34 See id. 
 35 Id. at 8. 
 36 Id. at 36. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
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preparing the draft and final EISs. 39  And while the Inspector General’s Office 
eventually found the State Department “did not violate its role as an unbiased 
oversight agency,” 40  this was only the first of many questions concerning the 
adequacy of the final EIS.41 
 Specifically, after the final EIS was completed, it was submitted for public 
comment. During the public comment phase, the final EIS received substantial 
comments regarding concerns over whether the Keystone XL pipeline would be a 
significant environmental hazard.42 Among other worries, citizens voiced concerns 
that the pipeline would be routed through environmentally sensitive areas in 
Nebraska and the rest of the Ogallala Aquifer, which provides a significant quantity 
of the Midwest’s water.43 Concerned about the comments it received, the State 
Department delayed approval of the pipeline until it could further address the 
concerns raised by the EPA and other federal agencies and those concerns expressed 
during the public comment period.44 
 This time, the State Department’s decision was challenged by members of 
Congress who were concerned that the Department’s delay was a reaction to 
pressure from environmental groups and not a product of careful review of EIS 
findings.45 Thus, in December 2011, Congress passed legislation requiring the State 
Department to approve or deny the pipeline within sixty days.46 In January 2012, the 
State Department, with the consent of President Obama, announced it would deny a 
permit to TransCanada for the construction of the pipeline pending further 
evaluation of the project.47  
 This denial leaves the pipeline in a precarious position. At this point, well over 
three years have passed since the State Department denied TransCanada a permit; 
therefore, any further actions to approve the project may first need to be evaluated 
through preparation of new EIS.48 With the average EIS taking well over three years 
to prepare,49 any such requirement may in and of itself be the “kiss of death” for the 
project.50And importantly, further environmental impact studies might function to 
stall construction of the pipeline even if Congress acts to directly approve the project  
                                              
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 36–38.  
 42 Id.  
 43 See id. at 37. 
 44 Id. at 37–38. 
 45 See Keystone XL: #TimeToBuild, ENERGY & COMMERCE COMM.: U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, http://energycommerce.house.gov/content/keystone-xl, archived at 
http://perma.cc/RLH3-AMQG (last visited Aug. 17, 2014). 
 46 Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-78, § 501, 
125 Stat. 1280, 1289 (2011). 
 47 PARFOMAK ET AL., supra note 2, at 38. 
 48 Id.  
49  Piet deWitt & Carole A. deWitt, How Long Does It Take to Prepare an 
Environmental Impact Statement?, 10 ENVTL. PRAC. 164, 164 (2008). 
50 Cronin v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 919 F.2d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority, thus bypassing the State Department’s 
current control over the pipeline’s future.51 
 However, while the Keystone XL pipeline has already undergone significant 
environmental study, it is unclear whether the studies are complete or if further 
research will be conducted. While the Obama Administration seems to believe 
further environmental study is needed, 52  a recent House Resolution authorizing 
construction of the project unequivocally states that the current environmental 
regulation and evaluation is sufficient to allow the project to progress.53 
 Going forward, further environmental regulation or analysis of the proposed 
pipeline may need to take place at the state level—not the national level. The 
constitutionality of such regulation and analysis is the subject of the following 
sections of this Note. 
 
II.  THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
 
 The United States Constitution provides Congress with exclusive authority 
“[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”54 Over the course of the nation’s 
history, this clause has been the source of wide-sweeping congressional action, 
debate, and judicial scrutiny.55 Nevertheless, the Commerce Clause still “represents 
one of the broadest bases for the exercise of congressional authority” and continues 
to play an important part in congressional legislation.56 Indeed, should Congress act 
                                              
 51 Notably, the recent resolution passed by the U.S. House of Representatives explicitly 
provides that the current State Department’s final EIS meets the statutory requirements of 
NEPA. H.R. Res. 3, 113th Cong. (2013). However, whether this pronouncement by one part 
of Congress is sufficient to actually ensure the EIS is in compliance with NEPA remains an 
unanswered question. 
 52 See PARFOMAK ET AL., supra note 2, at 38. 
 53 H.R. Res. 3, 113th Cong. (2013) (“The final environmental impact statement issued 
by the Secretary of State on August 26, 2011, coupled with the Final Evaluation Report 
described in the previous sentence, shall be considered to satisfy all requirements of 
[NEPA] . . . .”). 
 54 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 55 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005) (holding Congress may regulate 
a purely intrastate activity if such activity affects interstate commerce in any way because 
the “Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict between federal 
and state law, federal law shall prevail”); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 131 (1942) 
(upholding the right of Congress to pass an agricultural law that prohibited farmers from 
growing wheat crops). But see Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 
(2012) (holding that while Congress enjoys broad power pursuant to the Commerce Clause, 
it does not have the power under the Clause to compel market participation); United States 
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) (noting that while Congress enjoys broad power under 
the Commerce Clause, there must still be some “nexus” between the legislation passed 
pursuant to the Clause and the activity the legislation seeks to regulate). 
 56 ADAM VANN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42124, PROPOSED KEYSTONE XL 
PIPELINE: LEGAL ISSUES 13 (2012). 
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to wrestle the authority to permit the Keystone XL pipeline away from the President, 
it would almost certainly be pursuant to its own authority to regulate commerce with 
the “foreign nation” of Canada. 
 In addition to providing Congress with the authority to regulate commerce, 
according to the United States Supreme Court, the Commerce Clause mandates that 
individual states are required to do the opposite in the face of congressional 
legislation.57 If a state passes a law that affects the flow of interstate commerce, that 
law will be struck down if it “clearly discriminates against interstate 
commerce . . . unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor 
unrelated to economic protectionism.”58 
 In modern application, the dormant Commerce Clause analysis takes two forms, 
depending on whether a law overtly regulates out-of-state commercial interests and 
is thus discriminatory “on its face.” First, if a challenged state statute is “facially 
discriminatory”—if it discriminates between in-state commerce and out-of-state 
commerce—the law will almost always be struck down as violating the dormant 
Commerce Clause.59 Second, if a law does not facially discriminate but nevertheless 
has a discriminatory impact on interstate commerce, a court will carefully evaluate 
the law to determine whether the law serves a legitimate state interest, such as public 
health, safety, or environmental concerns.60 If the statute serves a legitimate state 
interest, the law will usually stand even if it incidentally burdens commerce.61 
 The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is replete with examples of laws ruled 
unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause. 62  These cases seem to 
support a conclusion that any state regulation affecting interstate commerce will be 
struck down as invalid per se under the dormant Commerce Clause if the law 
discriminates against out-of-state economic interests to the benefit of in-state 
interests.63 However, one case stands out as an exception to this general rule and 
represents the type of precedent states might rely on to pass environmental 
regulation if they are dissatisfied with the obviously disputed environmental findings 
                                              
 57 See id.  
 58 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992). 
 59 VANN ET AL., supra note 56, at 13. 
 60 Id. at 13–14. 
 61 See id. 
 62 See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 
581–82 (1986) (holding New York state law that regulated only out-of-state liquor 
transaction a violation of the Commerce Clause); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 
432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977) (holding that a North Carolina law prohibiting the display of out-
of-state apple grade was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause because the law 
amounted to economic protectionism); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 
(1951) (holding a local zoning ordinance that regulated location of dairies unconstitutional 
under the Commerce Clause when those ordinances presented a substantial burden to 
interstate commerce). 
 63 Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) 
(recognizing that a state law that places a discriminatory restriction on commerce will almost 
always be found per se invalid). 
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in the current Keystone project EIS. 
 This case, Maine v. Taylor, 64  represents a rare exception in the Court’s 
otherwise uniform unwillingness to permit state laws that discriminate against out-
of-state economic interests. In Taylor, the Supreme Court considered a Maine law 
that prohibited importation of baitfish for use in commercial fishing.65 Taylor was 
arrested in Maine for violating the law and later indicted as having violated a portion 
of the federal Lacey Act, which provides criminal penalties should a person 
“import . . . any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of 
any law or regulation of any State or in violation of any foreign law.”66 Taylor 
demurred, alleging Maine’s law discriminated against out-of-state interests at the 
expense of Maine’s in-state economic interest and was, therefore, unconstitutionally 
burdensome to interstate commerce.67  
 Maine subsequently intervened, arguing that the “ban legitimately protects . . . 
[Maine] fisheries from parasites and nonnative species that might be included in 
shipments of live [out-of-state] baitfish.” 68  A federal district court agreed with 
Maine, holding the law passed constitutional scrutiny, but the First Circuit reversed, 
“agreeing with Taylor that the underlying state statute impermissibly restricts 
interstate trade.”69 On appeal, the Supreme Court first noted the Commerce Clause 
acts as a grant of congressional power to legislate and “that it . . . limits the power 
of the States to erect barriers against interstate trade.”70 Accordingly, if a state statute 
“affirmatively discriminate[s]” against out-of-state commerce, the law will fall.71 
 The law in question in Taylor explicitly targeted only those shipments of bait 
originating from outside Maine, and thus the law facially discriminated between in-
state and out-of-state interests. But the Supreme Court nevertheless held that because 
“Maine has a legitimate interest in guarding against imperfectly understood 
environmental risks, despite the possibility that they may ultimately prove to be 
negligible,” it could not read “constitutional principles underlying the commerce 
clause . . . as requiring the State of Maine to sit idly by and wait until potentially 
irreversible environmental damage has occurred . . . .” 72  Ultimately, the Court 
upheld the constitutionality of Maine’s law prohibiting the import of baitfish despite 
the fact that it burdened out-of-state commerce because Maine had a legitimate 
interest in preserving its “unique and unusually fragile” fisheries.73 
                                              
 64 477 U.S. 131 (1986). 
 65 Id. at 132–33. 
 66 Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A) (1981)). 
 67 Id. at 133. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 137 (quoting Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980)).  
 71 See id. at 138 (noting that in determining whether a statute violates the Commerce 
Clause, the proper inquiry is whether the law only “incidentally” burdens commerce as 
opposed to “affirmatively” discriminating against out-of-state economic transactions).  
 72 Id. at 148. 
 73 Id. at 150–51. Importantly, Taylor represents one of the few cases in which the Court 
found that a law aimed directly at out-of-state activity did not impermissibly infringe on 
2015] THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 281 
 For several reasons, Taylor is an important milestone case for states who seek 
to enact regulations to protect their environmental interests, even though such 
regulations may burden interstate commerce. First, because the Court upheld 
Maine’s law despite recognizing it discriminated against out-of-state commerce, 
other states may be able to rely on Taylor in passing laws to protect their own 
environmental interests regardless of the burden on interstate commerce.74 Next, 
because the Court upheld Maine’s law even though there were “impediments to 
complete success,” other states might find their own environmental regulations that 
provide only partial environmental protection withstand judicial scrutiny.75 Finally, 
Taylor stands for the proposition that although science may not agree on one 
particular course of action, a state need not “sit idly by” while the scientific 
community decides upon a particular solution, and may instead take affirmative 
steps to protect its environment.76 
 Taken together, these protective measures may prove particularly useful for 
states concerned about the environmental impact the Keystone XL pipeline might 
have on their state’s environments. Furthermore, going forward state legislation 
addressing pipeline regulation may be necessary for states to ensure adequate 
environmental protections should Congress approve the Keystone project. 
 
III.  THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE KEYSTONE XL  
PIPELINE PROJECT 
 
 If Congress approves the Keystone XL pipeline in its current form, Congress 
would likely attempt to meet the environmental requirements mandated by NEPA 
by first accepting the State Department’s current “final” EIS.77 For many states 
along the Keystone XL pipeline’s proposed path, however, such a determination 
may do little to alleviate fears concerning the environmental detriments that could 
                                              
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, thus withstanding the “strictest scrutiny” announced 
in prior decisions concerning constitutionality of state environmental statutes in the context 
of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 144 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979)). 
Thus, while strict scrutiny is generally fatal to facially discriminatory laws, Taylor stands for 
the important proposition that laws aimed at legitimate environmental concerns may 
withstand applications of even the strictest scrutiny, so long as those laws do not represent 
pretextual or “arbitrary discrimination.” Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151–52. 
 74  It should be noted, however, that a state likely cannot enact a discriminatory 
regulation to protect its environment if there are adequate nondiscriminatory measures that 
can be taken to effect the same protections. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 338 
(1979) (holding Oklahoma statute that banned the export of local fish was unconstitutional 
because it was effectively the “choice of the most discriminatory means even though 
nondiscriminatory alternatives would seem likely to fulfill the State’s purported legitimate 
local purpose more effectively”). 
 75 Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151. 
 76 Id. at 148. 
 77 See H.R. Res. 3, 113th Cong. (2013) (finding State Department’s final Keystone EIS 
meets the procedural requirements of NEPA). 
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flow from the construction and operation of the pipeline. For example, as noted in 
Part I, concerns over fragile environments along the proposed route of the pipeline 
and over Midwest water supplies found in large aquifers underlying the pipeline’s 
route might spur states to enact environmental protection laws based on the potential 
effects of the Keystone XL pipeline.78 If they do, these laws are likely to place 
environmental restrictions on the pipeline that the federal government has yet to 
enact. Accordingly, these laws may be the types of “facially” discriminatory laws 
that are “virtually per se” invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause.79 
 However, if states along the route of the proposed pipeline pass environmental 
regulations in furtherance of legitimate state interests, these laws might stand as 
constitutional because they would be instances of states protecting “against 
imperfectly understood environmental risks,” even if those risks “ultimately prove 
to be negligible.”80 Part III explores how far a state might go in enacting such 
legislation. Subpart A explores three cases—City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,81 
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 82  and Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of 
Environmental Quality of the State of Oregon83—that provide insight into the types 
of environmental regulations that may be permissible under the dormant Commerce 
Clause. Subpart B then moves on to suggest several strategies for states wishing to 
pass legislation to protect against the possible negative environmental ramifications 
of the Keystone XL pipeline. 
 
A.  Economic Protectionism vs. Environmental Protection: Lessons from City  
of Philadelphia, Hughes, and Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. 
 
 States seeking to protect their environments and natural resources from 
Keystone’s potential negative impacts have multiple options at their disposal. 
However, before states along the proposed route of the Keystone XL pipeline enact 
environmental legislation, they should understand three cases that deal specifically 
with environmental regulations that were not constitutional. 
 In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court struck down a New 
Jersey law that prohibited out-of-state waste disposal in New Jersey landfills.84 The 
Court held that because waste is an article of commerce, New Jersey’s ban on 
importation violated the dormant Commerce Clause.85 Writing for the majority, 
Justice Stewart repeated the now-familiar rule that state regulations intended strictly 
                                              
 78 PARFOMAK ET AL., supra note 2, at 36–37. 
 79 See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (holding state laws 
enacted for purely protectionist reasons are generally always invalid); accord Minnesota v. 
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981). 
 80 Taylor, 477 U.S. at 148.  
 81 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 
 82 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
 83 511 U.S. 93 (1994). 
 84 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978). 
 85 Id. at 628. 
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for economic protectionism are per se invalid. 86  He was also careful to note, 
however, that a state is free to pass laws to “safeguard the health and safety of its 
people” even if those laws impose an incidental burden on interstate commerce.87 
Thus, if a law or regulation advances a legitimate public interest, that interest must 
be weighed against the incidental burden that might be imposed on interstate 
commerce.88 
 A state law cannot do what New Jersey did in City of Philadelphia—ban an 
import from another state simply to protect a state’s economic interests while 
claiming the law exclusively to be environmental regulation. 89  Two important 
lessons, therefore, emerge from City of Philadelphia. First, state environmental 
regulations are permissible, even if they might incidentally burden interstate 
commerce.90 But second, if a state passes an environmental regulation to protect its 
environment, the regulation must legitimately be for environmental protection and 
not a ruse to halt an unpopular form of commerce. 91  In short, unless an 
environmental regulation “can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local 
concerns,” the regulation risks being struck down as an unconstitutional 
“protectionist measure” under the principles laid out in City of Philadelphia.92 
 Decided a year after City of Philadelphia, Hughes v. Oklahoma laid out a more 
specific three-prong test that is still applied today in determining whether a state or 
local regulation impermissibly infringes on commerce. 93  In Hughes, the Court 
considered an Oklahoma statute that proscribed importation of foreign baitfish.94 
Appellant Hughes was indicted when he imported a shipment of baitfish procured 
in Oklahoma into Texas in violation of the statute and subsequently appealed 
contending the law unconstitutionally violated the commerce clause.95 In reviewing 
the lower court’s reliance on prior precedent that generally permitted states broad 
discretion in enacting laws affecting wildlife within their borders, the Court 
overruled this precedent and held that the statute could not survive a commerce 
clause attack. 96 
 Citing to its decision in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,97 the Court noted the correct 
                                              
 86 Id. at 623–24. 
 87 Id. 
 88 See id.; see also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (holding “[i]f 
a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree” and that “the 
extent of the burden that will be tolerated will . . . depend on the nature of the local interest 
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate 
activities”). 
 89 City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 625–26. 
 90 See id. at 623–24. 
 91 See id. at 625–26. 
 92 Id. at 624. 
93 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979). 
 94 See id. at 323. 
 95 Id. at 324. 
 96 Id. at 324–25. 
 97 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
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inquiry into whether a statute impermissibly interferes with Congress’s power under 
the Commerce Clause requires the court to determine: 
 
(1) whether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly with only 
incidental effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against 
interstate commerce either on its face or in practical effect; (2) whether 
the statute serves a legitimate local purpose; and, if so, (3) whether 
alternative means could promote this local purpose as well without 
discriminating against interstate commerce.98 
 In applying the three-prong test derived from its decision in Pike, the Court 
first noted that the statute at issue was designed to “overtly block[] the flow of 
interstate commerce at [the] State’s borders” 99  and accordingly was facially 
discriminatory such that the first prong of the test “by itself may be a fatal defect” 
to the law at issue.100 Nevertheless, the court moved on to find that—in addition to 
failing the test’s first prong—the statute additionally failed to further a legitimate 
state interest via the least-discriminatory means possible and was thus “repugnant to 
the Commerce Clause.”101 Accordingly, the Court’s holding in Hughes is both an 
application and clarification of Pike, making clear that any state statute that burdens 
interstate commerce must clear three high hurdles to be constitutionally 
permissible.102 
                                              
 98 Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the three-
prong test announced in Hughes represented the first time the Court had announced a specific 
means of inquiring as to the constitutionality of a statute as it relates to the Commerce Clause, 
the test is essentially a distillation of the Court’s historical dormant Commerce Clause 
inquiries. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute 
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on 
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”); Huron Portland 
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960) (“Evenhanded local regulation to 
effectuate a legitimate local public interest is valid unless preempted by federal action . . . .”); 
S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 766 (1945) (“Congress, in enacting legislation within 
its constitutional authority over interstate commerce, will not be deemed to have intended to 
strike down a state statute designed to protect the health and safety of the public unless its 
purpose to do so is clearly manifested . . . .”). 
 99 Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337 (second alteration in original) (quoting City of Philadelphia 
v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).  
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 337–38. 
 102 Arguably of greatest importance for any state that wishes to pass legislation to 
mitigate the possible detrimental effects of the Keystone XL pipeline is the Court’s 
announcement in Hughes that any facially discriminatory law “[a]t a minimum . . . invokes 
the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and of the absence of 
nondiscriminatory alternatives.” 441 U.S. at 322. Thus, in addition to ensuring any future 
state law would pass Hughes’s three-part test, a state should also consider whether any 
facially discriminatory regulation would stand up under the extraordinarily heavy burden of 
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 Finally, in Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental 
Quality of the State of Oregon, the Supreme Court considered a case similar to City 
of Philadelphia and struck down an Oregon law that imposed a surcharge on out-of-
state solid waste. 103  The law at issue imposed a $2.25 per ton charge on the 
importation of waste from outside the state.104 Oregon insisted the surcharge was 
necessary to help the state recoup costs of disposing of out-of-state waste that it 
would otherwise have collected in the form of taxes or municipal fees.105 However, 
the Supreme Court disagreed, noting that because the fee applied only to imported 
waste, it could not stand unless Oregon could show it advanced a local interest that 
could not be advanced in a non-discriminatory alternative manner. 106  Because 
Oregon was unable to show this was the case, the Supreme Court struck down the 
surcharge as unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause.107 
 Like the Court’s prior decision in City of Philadelphia and Hughes, Oregon 
Waste Systems also provides a valuable lesson for states wishing to pass legislation 
to protect their environment from the possible negative impacts of the Keystone XL 
pipeline. Namely, if a state wishes to pass environmental regulations that burden 
interstate commerce, it must ensure that no alternative methods are available that 
would lessen that burden. 108  As explained below, states along the route of the 
Keystone XL pipeline should apply the lessons from all three of these cases to ensure 
they can pass laws that provide adequate environmental protections and that will not 
risk being struck down as unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause. 
 
B.  Guidelines for Future State Environmental Laws 
 
 If states along Keystone XL’s proposed route believe they must act to protect 
their environments, they must do so carefully to avoid having their laws struck down 
as unconstitutional. With careful planning, however, states like Montana, South 
Dakota, and Nebraska can ensure their laws provide heightened protection against 
possible negative environmental impacts from the pipeline. There are several 
effective and constitutional ways for states to ensure the survival of their laws. 
 First, states concerned about their citizens’ welfare should work to ensure 
future environmental studies are based on objective science and well-accepted health 
and safety criteria.109 By using unbiased application of objective criteria in assessing 
                                              
strict scrutiny.  
 103 See 511 U.S. 93, 95–98 (1994). 
 104 Id. at 99. 
 105 See id. at 100. 
 106 Id. at 100–01. 
 107 Id. at 108. 
 108 Id. at 100–01. Importantly, because the Court has indicated the “health and safety” 
of a state’s citizenry are legitimate interests, if a state can show the regulation is necessary 
to advance either of these interests, the regulation may have an increased chance of passing 
constitutional muster under the Commerce Clause. See id. 
 109  See Justin M. Nesbit, Note, Commerce Clause Implications of Massachusetts’ 
Attempt to Limit the Importation of “Dirty” Power in the Looming Competitive Retail Market 
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environmental impacts, a state law has a better chance of applying equally to in-state 
and out-of-state market participants and avoiding the types of facially discriminatory 
regulations that will almost always doom a law to failure. Thus, in the case of the 
Keystone XL pipeline, laws that are premised on objective criteria, but that also 
happen to incidentally burden interstate commerce to a greater extent than local 
projects, would be less likely to be found unconstitutional. 
 Along these same lines, passing laws that apply generally to all petroleum 
pipelines may permit a state to regulate Keystone XL specifically while avoiding the 
types of facially discriminatory laws that would be found unconstitutional.110 As the 
Supreme Court said, “[i]t is not necessary to look beyond the text of [the] statute to 
determine that it discriminates against interstate commerce.”111 Thus, any law that 
expressly distinguishes between in-state and out-of-state pipelines would almost 
certainly be suspected of creating the type of “economic isolationism” the Court’s 
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has repeatedly held unconstitutional.112 
Conversely, laws that apply equally to both intra- and inter-state pipelines avoid the 
“virtually per se rule of invalidity” reserved for facially discriminatory legislation, 
even though the law may disproportionately impact foreign commerce.113 
                                              
for Electricity Generation, 38 B.C. L. REV. 811, 848–49 (1997) (suggesting laws passed 
pursuant to objective health and safety data are more likely to pass constitutional muster, 
even if they incidentally place greater burdens on foreign commerce); see also Minnesota v. 
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 (1981) (noting a regulation that promoted 
legitimate state interests in “conservation of energy and other natural resources” was not a 
violation of the Commerce Clause when studies showed the regulation was the least 
discriminatory means to bring about the desired environmental effects). 
 110 See Stephen M. Johnson, Beyond City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 95 DICK. L. 
REV. 131, 143 (1990). 
 111 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 575–76 
(1997). 
 112 Id. at 578–79. 
 113 Id. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Importantly, a court examining these laws through 
the lens of the dormant Commerce Clause would likely find such regulations do not rise to 
the level of unconstitutionality so long as they advance a legitimate environmental interest. 
Thus, a state’s decision to incentivize or discourage industry activity by enacting pipeline 
regulation that disproportionately affects the Keystone XL pipeline would not automatically 
violate the dormant Commerce Clause. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 
F.3d 1070, 1089 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[A] regulation is not facially discriminatory simply 
because it affects in-state and out-of-state interests unequally.”). Instead, a state regulation 
that disproportionately affects the Keystone XL pipeline would likely stand so long as the 
regulation did not force the owners of the pipeline to enact a particular regulatory standard 
and only incentivized industry practices equally applicable to all market participants. See id. 
at 1101–04 (finding a California law did not regulate “extraterritorial conduct” when it 
incentivized the use of certain in-state fuels over out-of-state fuels because the law did not 
mandate that out of state participants adopt a particular regulatory standard). Further, in the 
interim the administrative and legal burdens imposed by fighting the constitutionality of a 
state law might prove to be so detrimental to TransCanada’s business interests that it chooses 
to comply with stricter environmental regulations for the sake of avoiding costly construction 
delays. C.f. VANN ET AL., supra note 56, at 16 (discussing the potential impact of legal and 
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 Nevertheless, if the enacted regulation was purported to apply to both in-state 
and out-of-state oil pipelines, but instead affected only the Keystone XL pipeline, a 
court could find the burdens outweigh the benefits and strike the regulation down.114 
Thus, if a state does decide to use this strategy to pass a law, the putative local 
benefits of the regulation, such as health and safety, would still need to outweigh 
any burdens on interstate commerce the regulation would impose and be 
unachievable through alternative nondiscriminatory means.115 Such a high bar may 
make passage of any law regulating the Keystone XL pipeline easier to propose than 
to pass.  
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, while a state may not be able to pass a 
regulation that interferes with interstate commerce, Congress has no authority to 
force a state to enter the marketplace to advance commerce.116 This may prove to be 
a big bargaining chip for a state like Montana, which stands to gain substantially if 
it can route billions of barrels of Montana crude oil through the Keystone XL 
pipeline.117 For example, if Montana was overly concerned about Keystone XL’s 
environmental impact on Montana, it could abstain from allowing oil leases on its 
state lands, thereby limiting the flow of oil to the Keystone project.118 In doing so, it 
could effectively force TransCanada to accept environmental regulation or run the 
risk of having substantially less oil in its pipeline.119  
                                              
administrative burdens on the expense and viability of the Keystone XL pipeline). 
 114  Nevertheless, the fact that a regulation discriminates only against out of state 
commerce is insufficient in and of itself to establish a violation of the dormant Commerce 
Clause. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1089–90. Instead, a regulation that 
discriminated against the Keystone XL pipeline would be found to violate the Commerce 
Clause only if a state failed to show such discrimination was only incidental to the regulation 
in question and served a legitimate purpose that was not achievable through other non-
discriminatory means. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).  
 115 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). It should be noted that the 
Supreme Court has not held that nondiscriminatory means are present simply when a 
nonregulatory alternative is available. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 603 
n.3 (1997). Instead, a state could choose either to enact an environmental regulation or to 
subsidize in-state production to essentially price foreign commerce out of the market. Id. 
Thus, under the Court’s historic dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, a state appears to 
have discretion to enact either a market-based or regulatory-based incentive (or, presumably, 
a combination of the two). Id. 
 116 See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586–91 (2012). 
 117 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 13, at 
ES-3 (noting that the Keystone XL project linking to Montana would allow transport of 
100,000 barrels per day of crude oil). 
 118 C.f. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 n.6 (1978) (noting that 
the Court expresses “no opinion about New Jersey’s power, consistent with the Commerce 
Clause, to restrict to state residents access to state-owned resources”). 
 119 TransCanada’s current proposal anticipates significant inputs of up to two hundred 
and fifty thousand barrels of U.S. crude oil per day from projects in Montana, North Dakota, 
and Oklahoma. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Presently, the Keystone XL pipeline—and its potential impacts on the 
environment—is in limbo. President Obama, the State Department, and the EPA all 
believe more study is needed on the potential environmental impacts of the pipeline 
before it can be approved. On the other hand, many in the House of Representatives, 
business, and industry believe the boost Keystone XL would provide to the U.S’s 
economy, job creation, and energy independence eclipses any residual benefits 
further environmental study might yield. 
 While it appears unlikely Congress will be able to approve the pipeline 
pursuant to its authority to regulate foreign commerce under the Commerce Clause 
anytime soon, if it could do so in the future, states concerned about the possible 
environmental ramifications of the project might be forced to take action at the state 
level in order to protect their environments. To do this, states must be sure to not 
discriminate against interstate or foreign commerce in order to avoid violating the 
dormant Commerce Clause. 
 But while the dormant Commerce Clause presents obstacles to state 
environmental regulation, it need not block effective state regulation of 
environmental quality. Through objective assessment, nondiscriminatory legislation, 
careful planning for the use of state resources, and adherence to prior dormant 
Commerce Clause precedent, states concerned about the Keystone XL pipeline can 
ensure adequate environmental protection, even if the Federal Government fails to 
do so. 
 
                                              
13, at ES-3. 
